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THE IMPACT OF MINIMUM WAGES ON WAGES, WORK AND 






In this paper we use an individual- and household-level panel data set to study the impact of 
changes in legal minimum wages on a host of labor market outcomes including: a) wages and 
employment, b) transitions of workers across jobs (in the covered and uncovered sectors) and 
employment status (unemployment and out of the labor force), and c) transitions into and out of 
poverty.  We find that changes in the legal minimum wage affect only those workers whose initial 
wage (before the change in minimum wages) is close to the minimum. For example, increases in 
the legal minimum wage lead to significant increases in the wages and decreases in employment 
of private covered sector workers who have wages within 20% of the minimum wage before the 
change, but have no significant impact on wages in other parts of the distribution. The estimates 
from the employment transition equations suggest that the decrease in covered private sector 
employment is due to a combination of layoffs and reductions in hiring.  Most workers who lose 
their jobs in the covered private sector as a result of higher legal minimum wages leave the labor 
force or go into unpaid family work; a smaller proportion find work in the public sector. We find 
no evidence that these workers become unemployed.  
 
Our analysis of the relationship between the minimum wage and household income finds: a) 
increases in legal minimum wages increase the probability that a poor worker’s family will move 
out of poverty, and b)  increases in legal minimum wages are more likely to reduce the incidence 
of poverty and improve the transition from poor to non-poor if they impact the head of the 
household rather than the non-head; this is because the head of the household is less likely than a 
non-head to lose his/her covered sector employment due to a minimum wage increase and 
because those heads that do lose covered sector employment are more likely to go to another 
paying job than are non-heads (who are more likely to go into unpaid family work or leave the 
labor force).   
 
JEL Codes: J3 (Wages, Compensation and Labor Costs), O17 (Formal and Informal 
Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements) 
Key Words: minimum wages, employment, poverty. 2 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The justification for minimum wage legislation is to redistribute income to low wage 
workers.  This policy tool can be especially important in developing countries during 
periods of rapid adjustment to the global economy.  However, in an era when global 
competition is very strong, some policy makers argue for reductions in (and even the 
abolition of) minimum wages and other labor market regulation in developing countries 
to allow for more labor market flexibility and increased competitiveness (see e.g., 
Heckman and Pages, 2000).  The main argument is that rigidities in the labor market, 
such as wage rigidity caused by the minimum wage, can slow down job creation and in 
turn contribute to unemployment and poverty (see e.g., Pagés and Micco, 2006).  On the 
other hand, fierce competition in the globalized world created an environment that some 
have termed ―the race to the bottom.‖  There is concern that wages and working 
conditions are driven down by global competition and there is a need to uphold the 
bottom with regulations such as the minimum wage and labor standards.  In fact, 
Acemoglu (2001) argues that minimum wages can shift the composition of employment 
toward high-wage jobs.  If so, increases in minimum wages could contribute to the 
reduction of poverty and inequality by increasing the incomes of those affected by the 
legislation and perhaps even creating new higher wage jobs. 
 
In this paper, we examine the impact of minimum wages on several outcomes in the labor 
market.  First, we investigate the extent to which minimum wages raise wages and/or 
lower employment in the sector covered by minimum wage legislation. Second, we also 
study the dynamics in the labor market following increases in minimum wages.  Do 
workers forced out of employment in the covered sector become unemployed or move 
into employment in the uncovered sector? Does employment in the covered sector fall 
because employers reduce new hires or because they lay off workers?  To answer these 
questions, we examine the employment transitions of workers from the private covered to 
private uncovered sectors and the public sector, and employment transitions across 
employment status (from employment to unemployment and out of the labor force).  The 
size of these flows will indicate the magnitude of the impact of the minimum wage and 
the extent to which workers become better or worse off.  Finally, we examine the impact 3 
 
of minimum wage legislation on household income and ask if it is an effective policy tool 
for poverty reduction.   
 
Nicaragua provides an excellent location to study minimum wages because the country 
has:  (a) a relatively high level of legal minimum wages compared to average wages, 
which means that minimum wages have the potential to affect a large fraction of the 
population; (b) substantial variation in minimum wages both across industries and over 
time; (c) a large proportion of private sector workers not legally covered by minimum 
wages (the self-employed); and (d) a large sector of small firms where employers often 
avoid minimum wage legislation.  
 
The study of the impact of minimum wages in developing economies has been a fruitful 
area of research in recent years.  Recent papers include studies of Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey and 
South Africa.
1  In these papers, researchers have studied the impact of minimum wages 
on: average wages and the distribution of wages; employment, unemployment and hours 
worked; the distribution of wages and employment between the formal and informal 
sectors; and poverty.
2  In our paper, we extend this literature in several ways.  First, we 
estimate the impact of minimum wages on wages and employment in Nicaragua, a 
country not previously studied.  Second, we estimate the impact of minimum wages 
separately on new hires vs. layoffs.  Ours is the first study of a developing economy to 
explicitly show that minimum wages not only result in workers leaving the covered 
                                                 
1 These studies include: Brazil (Lemos, 2009; Neumark, Cunningham and Siga, 2006; Carneiro and 
Corseuil, 2001; Fajnzylber, 2001), Chile (Montenegro and Pages, 2004); Colombia (Maloney and Nunez, 
2004, Arango and Panchon, 2004), Costa Rica (Gindling and Terrell, 2005 and 2007); Honduras (Gindling 
and Terrell, 2009 and 2010), Indonesia (Rama, 2001), Kenya (Andalon and Pages, 2008), Mexico (Bosch 
and Manacorda, 2010; Cunningham and Siga, 2006); Turkey (Ozturk, 2006),Trinidad and Tobago (Strobl 
and Walsh , 2001), and South Africa (Hertz, 2005). 
2 These include studies of  the impact of minimum wages in developing economies on: wages and the 
distribution of wages (Andalon and Pages, 2008; Bosch and Manacorda, 2009; Cunningham, 2007; Hertz, 
2005; Lemos, 2009; Maloney and Nunez, 2004; Neumark, Cunningham and Siga, 2006, Stroble and 
Walsch, 2001; Fanzylber, 2001), employment, unemployment and hours worked (Carneiro and Corseuil, 
2001; Gindling and Terrell, 2007 and 2009; Hertz, 2005; Lemos, 2009; Maloney and Nunez, 2004; 
Montenegro and Pages, 2004; Ozturk, 2006; Rama, 2001), part-time and full-time work (Ozturk, 2006), the 
formal and informal sectors (Andalon and Pages, 2008; Bosch and Manacorda, 2010; Gindling and Terrell, 
2007 and 2009; Maloney and Nunez, 2004), and poverty (Arango and Panchon, 2004; Gindling and Terrell, 
2010; Lustig and McLeod, 1997; Saget, 2001). 4 
 
sector, but also result in a reduction in new hires into the covered sector from the 
uncovered sector.   Third, we examine the impact of changes in minimum wages on the 
movement of workers (transitions) between the covered sector, public sector, self-
employment, unpaid family work, unemployment and out of the labor force.  For 
example, we show that in Nicaragua workers who lose covered sector employment 
because of higher minimum wages are likely to become unpaid family workers or leave 
the labor force (and not become self-employed or unemployed).  Fourth, we analyze the 
impact of higher minimum wages on transitions into and out of poverty.  We present 
evidence that higher minimum wages in Nicaragua increase the probability that a poor 
worker’s family will move out of poverty.  We also present evidence that the impact of 
minimum wages differs between household heads and non-heads, and explain how these 
differences affect the impact of minimum wages on poverty.   Panel data is essential in 
allowing us to make these unique contributions to the literature because, in addition to 
allowing us to control for individual-specific fixed effects, it is only with panel data that 
we can identify employment transitions and changes in the incomes of the same 
individuals or households both before and after the minimum wage change.  The 
individual-level panel data set that we use was created for this study from an existing 




To study the impact of minimum wages on the labor market in Nicaragua, we use annual 
panel data collected by Fundación Internacional para el Desafío Económico Global 
(FIDEG) between 1998 and 2006.
3 This data set is based on a 1996 FIDEG household 
survey of 6,028 dwellings, which is considered to be representative of the population of 
households in Nicaragua.  The households were selected using stratified random 
sampling techniques and information on the location of all dwellings in each electoral 
district of the country.
4 The 1998 survey is based on a random sub-sample of 1,600 
                                                 
3 FIDEG is an independent public policy research institute in Nicaragua that carries out policy 
oriented research on Nicaragua’s socio-economic development. 
4 The method used was to first randomly select 58 (out of a total of 156) municipalities, based on 
their share of the total population and  fulfilling a quota of 50% urban. Electoral districts within 5 
 
dwellings (816 urban and 784 rural) from the 1996 survey. The principal household in 
each of these dwellings was interviewed annually between the months of July and 
September from 1998 to 2006. 
 
Enormous care was taken to track each household and each member of the household 
over this period. For example, the interviewer first determined if the household was 
interviewed the previous year or if this was its first interview.
5 The questionnaires had the 
first and last names of each household member interviewed the previous year, with a 
designated line item for all years (i.e., that could never be occupied by any other 
household member). If a member was no longer in the household, questions were asked 
about that person’s location in order to catch migration flows. On the other hand, new 
household members were designated a line in the questionnaire along with an explanation 
about their origin in the household (by marriage, birth, etc.).  
 
Our analytical sample consists of 27,000 observations on 8,682 working age individuals 
(an average 3.1 observations each).  About one-third of the sample has two observations, 
one-fifth has three observations and 7 percent have nine observations. The Appendix 
Table A1 contains descriptive statistics on our analytical sample.   
 
Given that the panel data is based on a small sample, we have checked its 
representativeness by comparing some basic characteristics of the workforce with those 
of the Nicaraguan LSMS survey carried out by the World Bank in 1998 and 2005.  We 
find that the distribution of the economic activity of the workers is quite similar for the 
two samples in 1998 but there is some divergence in the two 2005 samples as there is a 
higher share in the tertiary sector in the FIDEG sample. There seems to be a higher share 
of unpaid family workers in the FIDEG sample and whereas the average incomes look 
                                                                                                                                                 
each municipality were then selected randomly and dwellings were then selected randomly within 
each district. Within each dwelling, the ―principal‖ household was interviewed.  
5  If the original household   left the dwelling (e.g., migrated)  it was  replaced with  the new 
household in the dwelling, with an indication that it was a new household . If the dwelling was 
destroyed,  the  dwelling  next  door  was  selected,  with  an  indication  that  this  was  a  new 
dwelling/household. 6 
 
lower, the median incomes are very similar for the two samples. See Appendix Table A2 
for further detail.    
 
The second source of data used is the legal minimum wage decrees from the Nicaraguan 
Ministry of Labor.  Nicaragua sets minimum wages for all workers in the private sector 
for each of twelve industrial sectors, plus separate minimum wages for workers in free-
trade zones (special regimes) and in the central and municipal government. During the 
years for which we have panel data, new minimum wages are set every year except for 
1998 and 2000. Table 1 summarizes the changes in the hourly legal minimum wage for 
the years we analyze. 
6     
 
We assign to each worker in the FIDEG panel data set a minimum wage based on his/her 
industry of employment. This implies that we cannot assign a minimum wage to workers 
who are not in the labor force or to those unemployed people who have not worked 
before.  Further, we cannot identify workers in free-trade zones, nor can we distinguish 
central and municipal government workers from workers in state-owned firms (for whom 
the private sector minimum wage applies); therefore we assign to these workers the 
minimum wage that is applicable to the private sector industry in which they work.  We 
assign to full-time workers (working 40 or more hours a week) a monthly and hourly 
minimum wage (calculated as indicated in the previous footnote) and to part-time 
workers only an hourly minimum wage.   
 
We find that the minimum wage is high relative to the mean and median wages of private 
sector workers during the period that we study.  The ratio of the mean minimum wage to 
the mean wage is 0.53 and the ratio to the median wage is 0.81.  The trend over this 
period is fairly constant, with dips in 1998 and 2000, when the minimum wage was not 
changed. 
                                                 
6 Legal minimum wages in Nicaragua are published as monthly earnings for full-time workers 
and as hourly and daily wages for part-time workers. The daily wage is calculated by the Ministry 
of Labor as the monthly minimum wage divided by 30.4. The Labor Code considers holidays and 
Sundays to be working days, hence 30.4 is the average number of formal working days per 
month. The hourly minimum wage is then calculated as the daily wage divided by 8. 7 
 
 
3. Compliance Issues 
 
The law decrees that all private and public sector employees in Nicaragua be paid at least 
the minimum wage.  The workers not covered by minimum wage legislation are the self-
employed (who include the owners of small firms) and unpaid family workers; these 
workers compose the uncovered sector.  Before examining the impact of minimum wage 
legislation, it is important to detect the sectors of the labor market where there is 
compliance with minimum wage legislation.  There are several ways in which we check 
for compliance in the data.   
 
3.1. Comparing the Distribution of Wages and Legal Minimum Wages 
A straightforward method is to look for spikes in the wage distribution at or around the 
minimum wage. Given the multiple minimum wages in Nicaragua, we simplify the 
graphical analysis by plotting the kernel density estimate of the log wage minus log 
minimum wage for each worker.  In these figures a zero indicates that the worker is 
earning the legal minimum wage. To test for different levels of compliance, we construct 
these figures for five different groups:  the total covered private sector, large firms in the 
covered private sector, small firms in the covered private sector, the covered public 
sector, and the uncovered self-employed.  The rationale for analyzing three groups in the 
covered sector separately is to decipher the extent to which the small scale sector 
complies with minimum wages, and to separate out the public sector workers, who tend 
to have higher wages in most Central American countries.  
 
To construct the kernel density estimates, for full-time workers we compare monthly 
earnings to the monthly minimum wage.  For part-time workers, we compare the hourly 
wages to the hourly minimum wage.  The kernel density estimates are presented in Figure 
1, with the same scale to make comparisons between sectors easier. A value above 
(below) zero indicates that those workers earn above (below) the legal minimum wage.  
These figures suggest that legal minimum wages have some impact in the covered private 
sector and in the public sector.  In those two covered sectors we see spikes in the 8 
 
distribution near zero and the distributions show some evidence of censoring below the 
minimum wage.  However, the evidence of censoring is not strong; a large proportion of 
workers in the covered sectors earn less than that minimum wage.  The censoring and 
spike near zero in the distribution in the covered private sector are more pronounced for 
large private sector firms than for small covered private sector firms.  This might suggest 
that compliance is greater in large private sector firms than in small private sector firms.  
In the uncovered self-employed sector there is no evidence of censoring, but there is a set 
of spikes in the distribution near the minimum wage.  
 
There is a question as to whether Figure 1 is not capturing compliance cleanly because of 
potential measurement error in the hourly wage and hourly minimum wage variables that 
we use for part-time workers.  (This is because the hourly measures are calculated from 
monthly measures that are divided by reported number of hours worked, which can have 
substantial measurement error.)  As a result, we also provide kernel density estimates for 
subsample of full-time workers only in Figure 2. It is clear from these estimates that the 
findings in Figure 1 hold; they are not sullied by measurement error.  
 
In summary, the kernel density estimates provide some evidence of compliance with 
minimum wages in the covered sector, especially large firms, in Nicaragua, and non-
compliance in the uncovered (self-employed) sector.  However, this evidence is not 
strong.   
 
3.2. Proportion of Workers Earning the Minimum Wage by Sector of Employment 
Another way to summarize the information on compliance is to calculate the average 
share of workers earning less than the minimum wage, near the minimum wage, or more 
than the minimum wage within each of these four sectors.
  We use a bound of 20% to 
allow for measurement error so that we are actually measuring the share earning less than 
0.8 of the minimum wage, within 0.8 and 1.2 of the minimum wage and more than 1.2 of 
the minimum wage. These data are presented in Table 2, separately for the private 
covered, public and uncovered self-employed sectors.  We also divide the private covered 
sector into small and large firms. 9 
 
 
There is some evidence that compliance is greater in the covered private sector than in 
the uncovered self-employed sector: while 25.5% of workers in the private covered sector 
earn within 20% of the minimum wage, only 15.6% of self-employed workers earn 
within 20% of the minimum wage.  While this is evidence that compliance is greater in 
the covered sector than in the uncovered sector, compliance is far from universal even in 
the covered sector; it is clear that a significant proportion of workers, even in those 
sectors legally covered by minimum wages, earn less than the minimum wage: as many 
as 23% of the workers in the private covered sector.  Even in the public sector 4.1% of 
workers earn less than the legal minimum wage. 
 
Because many are surprised by the number of workers in Nicaragua earning less than the 
minimum wage, even in the large firm sector, and some surmise that it may be due to 
measurement error in the hourly wage and minimum wage variables, we also calculate 
these percentages using the monthly wage and minimum wage for the subsample of full-
time workers (who account for approximately about 50% of all workers).  The 
percentages in the second panel of Table 2 indicate that the proportion of covered sector 
full-time workers earning less than the minimum wage is similar to our previous results.  
Also, the share or full time uncovered self-employed workers earning less than the 
minimum wage is substantially larger than the share for all self-employed workers 
(including part-time workers).  
 
4. Wage and Disemployment Effects in the Covered Sector  
In this section we examine the extent to which increases in minimum wage rates raise 
wages and expel workers from the covered sector, as predicted by the competitive model 
of the labor market. 
 10 
 
4.1 Wage Effects 
We next estimate the elasticity of the wage with respect to the minimum wage in the 
covered sector.  Using the panel data set of workers we estimate the following wage 
equation on all workers who remain in the covered sector from one year to the next: 
, it t t
T
1 t It 2 it It 1 o    it μ YR γ Σ GDP a β X MW a α W   ln ln ln      (1) 
where the dependent variable,  lnWIt, is the change in the log of real wages of individual 
i between time t and time t+1. The explanatory variables include the change in the log of 
the real minimum wage between time t and time t+1 that applies to that worker’s industry 
category I in time t,  lnMWIt.  The coefficient  1 is an estimate of the impact on actual 
wages of changes in the legal minimum wage. Other explanatory variables include the 
vector Xit, of individual specific human capital variables (changes in years of education 
and whether the worker lives in an urban area) and the change in the log of real value-
added in industry I between time t and t+1 (lnGDP).
7 Finally, to control for endogenous 
changes in yearly average minimum wages (as well as other year-specific factors such as 
aggregate supply and aggregate demand changes, or the timing of minimum wage 
changes) we include a dummy variable for each year, YRt.   The estimated standard errors 
in all regression estimates reported in this paper (wage, employment, transition and 
poverty equations) are robust to heteroskedasticity and correct for clustering of the errors 
in the industry of the worker (which also corresponds to the minimum wage category). 
 
In addition to estimating the wage equations for individuals who are in the covered 
sectors at time t and time t+1, we also estimate the wage equations for those who remain 
self-employed from one year to the next as a placebo test. If minimum wages are being 
enforced in the covered sectors but not the uncovered sector, then changes in the 
minimum wage should positively affect the wages of those who remain in the covered 
                                                 
7 Note that since we are estimating a model based on  first-differencing the individual-level data, 
the characteristics of individuals that do not change over time (such as gender), or change by the 
same amount each year (such as age or experience) are already controlled for and cannot be 
explicitly included in this regression. 11 
 
sector and have no direct positive effect on the wages of those who remain self-employed 
from t to t+1.
8  
 
Since we expect that legal minimum wages will have a larger impact on the wages of 
workers who earn near the minimum wage, we also estimate the impact of minimum 
wages on the wages of workers who were within 20% of the legal minimum wage at time 
t (before the minimum wage was changed).    
 
Finally, we estimate equation (1) for the groups mentioned above with the hourly 
minimum wage and hourly wage data for all workers (both full-time and part-time 
workers) and also for those workers within 20% of the minimum wage at time t.  We also 
estimate the wage equation using the monthly wage and monthly minimum wage for only 
full-time workers who were within 20% of the minimum wage at time t, to control for 
measurement error.
9   
 
                                                 
8 Even if legal minimum wages are not complied with among the self-employed, it is possible that higher 
legal minimum wages in the covered sector could have an indirect impact on wages in the self-employed 
sector.  For example, higher legal minimum wages in the covered sector could cause reduced employment 
in that sector, pushing workers into self-employment, increasing the supply of labor in that sector and 
driving down the wages of the self-employed. 
9 Another potential problem in the estimation of the wage equation is a violation of the strict exogeneity 
assumption.  In the estimate of first difference equations, the strict exogeneity assumption is violated if 
there is feedback from the dependent variable in period t to an independent variable in a future period 
(Wooldridge, 2002).  This may occur in our estimates of the wage equation, for example, if a bad (or good) 
wage shock in the past year affects decisions to increase education.  For example, a higher wage in time t 
might make it affordable for a low-income worker to complete higher education in time s>t.   Such 
feedback can be captured by including a lagged dependent variable in the regression (Wooldridge, 2002).  
However, the presence of a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable in the estimated growth 
equation creates a potential bias, as the lagged dependent variable will be correlated with the error term in 
the regression.  Arellano and Bond (1991) develop a dynamic panel data model that addresses the problems 
of the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error terms (and also the potential 
problem of first-order autocorrelated errors).  The Arellano and Bond ―difference GMM‖ model estimates 
the  regression using first differences, and uses the values of the levels of the exogenous variables lagged 
two or more periods as additional instruments for the potentially endogenous independent variables (in 
addition to the temperature variables used in the 2SLS-IV).  We follow Arellano and Bond (1991) and use 
the simplest two period lag structure in constructing the instrumental variables.  In these regressions 
(available from the authors), the coefficients on the minimum wage variable in all of the equations 
estimated using data from the private covered sector are positive, although the estimates are statistically 
significant only for workers in small private covered sector firms.  The coefficient on the minimum wage 
variable using data from self-employed workers is always negative, although is only statistically significant 
for full-time workers with wages near the minimum wage. 
 12 
 
The estimated coefficients for these regressions are reported in Table 3.  They can be 
interpreted as elasticities — the percent change in actual wages given a one percent 
change in the legal minimum wage – and as evidence for compliance with the minimum 
wage laws.  The estimates of the coefficients on the minimum wage variable do provide 
evidence that legal minimum wages are complied with in the private covered sector.  The 
coefficients are positive, although statistically significant only for those workers whose 
wages were near the minimum wage. We estimate an elasticity of 0.58 for all covered 
private sector workers whose wages are within 20% of the minimum wage in time t, 
which rises to 0.65 for full-time covered sector workers whose wages are within 20% of 
the minimum wage.  The estimated elasticities are positive for both large and small firms 
and statistically significant for full-time workers near the minimum. The relative size of 
these coefficients also indicates that the impact of the minimum wage may be felt more in 
the large-firm private sector than in the small-firm private sector, although the difference 
in the coefficients is not statistically significant.  There is no statistically significant 
impact of minimum wage changes on the wages of private sector workers whose wages 
are not within 20% above the minimum wage (not shown in table).  The coefficient on 
the minimum wage variable in the wage equations for uncovered self-employed workers 
is never statistically significant, indicating that legal minimum wages are not complied 
with in this sector.
 10 
  
In summary, the wage equations suggest that minimum wage laws in Nicaragua are 
complied with in the private covered sector, but do not have a significant impact on the 
wages of workers in the uncovered self-employment sector.
11   
 
                                                 
10 Since we are unable to assign the correct minimum wage for workers in the FIDEG survey that say they 
work  for  the  public  sector,  but  do  not  indicate  if  they  work  for  a  state-owned  enterprise  or  public 
administration, we have not analyzed the impact of the minimum wage on their wages.  
11 As a specification test, we re-estimated the wage equations including industry dummy variables as 
explanatory variables.  These results are generally similar to those reported in table 3.  As another 
specification test, we re-ran the wage equations including lagged values of the minimum wage variables.  
In these regressions with lagged independent variables the coefficients on the lagged values were almost 
always insignificant.  In the one case where coefficient on the lagged value was not insignificant, it was the 
same sign as the coefficient on the concurrent value.  This was in the transition equation for unpaid family 
workers, and indicated once again that workers who lose their jobs in the covered sector are more likely to 13 
 
4.2. Disemployment Effects  
 
We next examine the impact of changes in minimum wages on the employment of 
workers in the private covered sectors.   Using the panel data set of workers and binomial 
probit analysis, we estimate, for all workers who were in the private covered sectors at 
time t, the following employment equations: 
, it t t
T
1 t It 2 it It 1 o    it μ YR γ Σ GDP a β X MW a α Prob(EMP ln ln ) 1       (2) 
where the dependent variable, Prob(EMPit=1) is equal to one if individual i remains 
employed in the covered sector between time t and time t+1, and zero if individual i loses 
his/her private covered sector employment between time t and time t+1 (and ends up 
either as a self-employed worker, unpaid family worker, unemployed or out of the labor 
force). The explanatory variables are the same as those in the wage equation.  From the 
coefficient  1 we can estimate the impact on the probability that a worker remains 
employed in the private covered sectors of a change in the legal minimum wage. 
 
Our estimates of the impact of changes in legal minimum wages on the probability that a 
worker remains in the private covered sector are reported in Table 4.  A negative number 
in Table 4 indicates that an increase in minimum wages reduces the probability that a 
worker keeps his/her employment in the private covered sector (that is, a negative 
number indicates that higher minimum wages increase the probability that a worker will 
lose his/her private covered sector employment).  These results imply that an increase in 
the legal minimum wage will result in a statistically significant fall in employment in the 
private covered sector; a 10% increase in the legal minimum wage will result in a 
decrease in the probability that a worker remains in the private covered sector by 3.1 
percentage points for all workers, a decrease of 5.2% for all workers with wages near the 
minimum wage, and a similar 5.1% fall in full-time employment near the minimum.  
Evaluated at the average proportion of workers in the private covered sector, these results 
imply that a 10% increase in the legal minimum wage results in approximately 5% of 
private covered sector employees losing employment in that sector.  We find a 
                                                                                                                                                 
become unpaid family workers than to go into any other sector.  Tables with these results are available 14 
 
statistically significant negative employment impact of increases in minimum wages in 
large, but not small, private covered sector firms. 
 
In summary, our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that increases in legal 
minimum wages in Nicaragua result in private covered sector workers losing their private 
sector employment, and that the decline is larger and statistically significant in the large-
firm private sector where wage impact of the minimum wage – i.e., compliance -- is 
stronger.   
 
5.  Dynamic Effects: Employment Transitions  
 
Higher minimum wages can lead to decreased employment in the private covered sector 
either because workers lose their private covered sector jobs and/or because fewer 
workers are hired into the private covered sector.  An original contribution of our work, 
which is possible because of the panel data that we create, is to trace the impact of 
minimum wages on employment flows into and out of the private covered sector, and 
from the private covered sector into other sectors (e.g., self-employed) and status in the 
labor market (unemployment and the labor force).  In sub-section 4.2 we showed that 
higher minimum wages lead to some workers losing private covered sector employment.  
In this subsection, we first examine where workers go who leave the private covered 
sector because of a minimum wage increase (e.g. into self-employment, the public sector, 
unemployment, unpaid family work, out of the labor force).   Then we examine whether 
there is evidence that an increase in the minimum wage also reduces employment in the 
private covered sector by lowering rates of new hiring into the private covered sector 
from the uncovered sectors. 
 
We first estimate a multinomial logit model using the sample of all workers employed in 
the private covered sector at time t, where it is possible for workers who start in the 
private covered sector to be found in one of the following sectors in time t+1: stay in the 
private covered sector, move to self-employment, move to unpaid family work, move to 
                                                                                                                                                 
from the authors at http://userpages.umbc.edu/~tgindlin/publications.html. 15 
 
the public sector, become unemployed or leave the labor force.  Specifically, we define a 
variable, TRANSikz,t, that indicates whether the worker moves from sector k (the private 
covered sector) into sector z (z= stay in the private covered sector, self-employment, 
unpaid family work, the public sector, unemployment or leave the labor force).  The base 
category is that a worker stays in the private covered sector.  Thus, the probability that 
individual i leaves the private covered sector (sector k) for sector/state z, conditional on 
starting in sector k (k = private covered sector, self-employed sector, unpaid family work, 
the public sector, unemployment or leave the labor force) is characterized by: 
 
)) exp(( 1 /( ) exp( ) 1 , , t ikz t ikz   t ikz, Prob(TRANS           (3) 
where  
t ikz, t zt
T
1 t It kz kz it It kz okz t ikz μ YR γ Σ GDP a β X MW a α     ln ln 2 1 ,    
 
The explanatory variables include the change in the log of the real minimum wage that 
applies to that worker’s industry I at time t,  MWIt.  The impact of minimum wages on 
the probability of moving from the private covered sector into sector z is measured using 
1z. We calculate the marginal impact of changes in legal minimum wages on the 
probability that workers leave the private covered sector and go into the public sector, 
self-employment, unpaid family worker sector, unemployment or leave the labor force.   
Other explanatory variables are the same as those in the wage and employment equations. 
 
Table 5 presents our estimates of the marginal impact of changes in legal minimum 
wages on the probability that workers leave the private covered sector and go into another 
sector; a positive number in Table 5 means that higher minimum wages increase the 
probability that a worker leaves his/her job in the private covered sector and moves to 
sector z. The results suggest that workers in the private covered sector lose their jobs 
when minimum wages increase, and that they are likely to become unpaid family 
workers.  This is a novel and robust result; it is true whether we use the sample of all 
workers, those within 20% of the minimum wage or full-time workers near the minimum 
wage. The effect is quite large, especially for full-time workers near the minimum wage, 16 
 
where a 1% increase in the minimum wage will increase the probability that a worker 
moves from the private covered sector to unpaid family work by 0.42 percentage points. 
Given that the mean (unconditional) probability is 4.2%, a 1% increase in the minimum 
wage will raise the probability to 4.6% (a 9 percent increase).  There is also evidence that 
other workers who leave the private covered sector may leave for a public sector job or 
leave the labor force; however, there is no evidence in Table 5 that workers who lose 
their jobs in the private covered sector move into self-employment or unemployment.
12 
 
Next, we also estimate the effect of minimum wages on the probability of being hired 
into the private covered sector from self-employment, unpaid family work or the public 
sector.  We first estimate the ―overall‖ effect on hires from any of these sectors, and then 
the ―specific‖ effect on hires from a specific sector (public sector, self-employment or 
unpaid family work
13). Specifically, we use the probit technique to estimate equations of 
the form: 
t, ikz, t zt
T
1 t It kz kz it It 1kz okz   t ikz, μ YR γ Σ GDP a β X MW a α   Prob(TRANS ln ln ) 1 2  (4)   
For the overall effect, the dependent variable,    t ikz, TRANS , equals 1 if the individual i is 
hired into the covered private sector at time t+1 from any other sector at time t; it is equal 
to zero if the individual remains in an uncovered sector from t to t+1.  For the specific 
                                                 
12 The minimum wage has less of an effect on flows from private sector work to out of the labor 
force: a 1% increase in the minimum wage will raise the probability 0.15 percentage points for all 
workers and 0.21 for workers earning around the minimum wage.  For all workers, this means 
raising the mean unconditional probability from 21.9% to 22.1%, which represents only a 0.6 
percent increase. For workers near the minimum wage the mean probability would rise from 
21.1% to 21.3% (or by 1.0 percent). 
  Our results suggest that there is clearly a drop in income for private covered sector workers who 
were near the minimum wage and lost their jobs, since most became unpaid family workers or 
left the labor force (where they no longer earn any wage).  However, given there is evidence that 
some workers are instigated to move to the public sector when there is an increase in the 
minimum wage, we next test for the wage effect on these workers.  We estimate wage equation 
(1) on workers who leave the private covered sector and end up working as public sector workers 
in time t+1 and in this way, we are able to estimate whether those who change jobs after 
minimum wage changes end up with lower wages in the public sector.  The findings show that 
those who move to the public sector do not have a significant change in their earnings.   
13We cannot measure whether legal minimum wages affect the transitions from unemployment 
and out of the labor force into the private formal sector because we do not know the industry of 
employment of those who are unemployed or not in the labor force in both time t and time t+1. 17 
 
effects,    t ikz, TRANS equals 1 if the individual i is hired into the covered private sector at 
time t+1 conditional on being in another specific sector (e.g., self employment) at time t; 
it is equal to zero if the individual remains in the other specific sector from t to t+1.   
 
Table 6 presents these estimates; a positive number in Table 6 would indicate that higher 
minimum wages increase the probability of a transition into the private covered sector 
from the self-employed, public or unpaid family worker sectors, while a negative number 
indicates that higher minimum wages decrease the probability that a worker will 
transition into the private covered sector.  The results imply that an increase in the legal 
minimum wage has a negative and statistically significant impact on the probability that a 
worker will be hired into the private covered sector from the public sector or self-
employment. The marginal effect is large.  A 1% increase in the minimum wage lowers 
the probability that a either a self-employed or public sector worker at time t will be hired 
into the private covered sector at t+1 by 0.52 percentage points for all workers within 
20% of the MW.  We find no evidence that higher minimum wages have an impact on the 
transition from unpaid family work into the private covered sector.        
 
In summary, the results of the estimation of the transition equations suggests that the 
decrease in employment in the private covered sector that results from a higher legal 
minimum wage is due both to workers leaving the private covered sector and to a 
reduction in the number of workers being hired into the private covered sector from the 
uncovered sectors.  Most workers who lose their jobs in the private covered sector as a 
result of higher legal minimum wages leave the labor force or go into unpaid family 
work; a smaller proportion may find work in the public sector.  We find no evidence that 
workers who lose their jobs in the private covered sector because of higher minimum 
wages become unemployed.
14  
                                                 
14 As a specification test, we re-ran the employment and transition regressions including lagged values of 
the minimum wage and the coefficients on the lagged values were almost always insignificant.  In the one 
case where coefficient on the lagged value was not insignificant, it was the same sign as the coefficient on 
the concurrent value.  This was in the transition equation for unpaid family workers, and indicated once 
again that workers who lose their jobs in the covered sector are more likely to become unpaid family 
workers than to go into any other sector.  These results are available from the authors (at 
http://userpages.umbc.edu/~tgindlin/publications.html).   18 
 
6.  Effects on Household Income and Poverty Alleviation 
 
The impact of legal minimum wages on households at different points in the distribution 
may be different from the impact on the distribution of wages.  Low wage workers may 
be secondary family workers in high income households while high wage workers may 
be the only workers in low wage households.  As Addison and Blackburn (1999) and 
Fields, Han and Kanbur (2007) point out, the impact of legal minimum wages on 
household incomes depends on how the pattern of employment composition changes 
within households. We cannot, therefore, infer from our results on the impact of 
minimum wages on individual wages and employment what the impact will be on either 
the distribution of household income or poverty alleviation. We must study directly the 
impact of legal minimum wages on household incomes. 
 
Minimum wage increases can help families move out of poverty if the family members 
keep their jobs and benefit from a wage increase, but they may be just as likely to stay 
poor (or become poor) if a family member affected by a minimum wage increase loses 
his/her job.  In this section we first examine the impact of minimum wages on the 
probability that a worker’s family is poor, and then examine the extent to which a 
minimum wage increase helps a family move out of poverty or push a family into 
poverty.  Given the importance of the head of the household’s income in the total income 
of the family,
15 we carry out an analysis that distinguishes the effect of minimum wage 
on the head and non-heads of the household.    
 
We first ask to what extent workers who earn the minimum wage are likely to be poor.  
The numbers in Table 7 indicate that if a household head is earning at or above the 
minimum wage, he/she is very likely to be in a non-poor household: 57% of the heads of 
households who earn around the MW are non-poor and 81% of the heads who earn above 
the minimum are non-poor.  However, if a non-household head is earning at or above the 
minimum wage, he/she is much less likely to be in a non poor household, where the 
                                                 
15 The head of the household’s labor income accounts on average for 74% of the household’s income; in 
poor households it rises to 81% and in non-poor households it is only 55%. 19 
 
comparable percentages are 37% and 58%.  Finally, both heads and non-heads of 
households are likely to be extremely poor or poor if they earn below the minimum wage.  
 
These results in Table 7 are a static picture of the probability that a worker is poor or non 
poor based on status in the household and the ratio of own wage to the minimum wage.  
We next ask ―What is the impact of a change in the minimum wage on the probability 
that a household is poor?‖  We answer this question using the panel data and estimating a 
probit equation using data for all workers, where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if 
the worker’s household is poor at t+1 (Poor =1) and 0 if non poor at time t+1 (Poor = 0), 
as a function of the change in the minimum wage from the period t to t+1:  
, it t t
T
1 t It 2 it It 1 o    it μ YR γ Σ GDP a β X MW a α Prob(POOR ln ln ) 1       (5) 
From the coefficient  1 a  we calculate the impact of a one percent change in the minimum 
wage on the probability that a worker’s family is poor.  The other variables in this 
equation are the same as those in equations (1) through (4).   
 
The results from this exercise, presented in Table 8, indicate that an increase in the 
minimum wage will significantly lower the probability that a household is poor, but only 
if the higher minimum wage applies to the household head; minimum wage increases for 
non-household heads have an insignificant impact on the incidence of poverty. The 
marginal effect (where all variables are taken at their mean values) of a 1% increase in 
the minimum wage lowers the incidence of poverty by 0.12 percentage points if it 
impacts a head.  Further, higher minimum wages have a significant positive impact only 
on families with more than one worker at time t.  Possibly this is because the minimum 
wage is set very low relative to the poverty line for a family, who are therefore likely to 
transition out of poverty only if the family receives income from at least two workers.  
The impact of a minimum wage increase does not differ significantly between male and 
female household heads.  
 
Up to now we have determined that changes in the minimum wage reduce the incidence 
of poverty if they impact heads of households with certain characteristics, but do they 20 
 
actually help households transition out of poverty?  Moreover, it might be possible that 
households with certain characteristics may be more likely to transition into poverty if 
some members lose their jobs as a result of the minimum wage increase.  In the next 
exercise, we estimate the impact of a change in the minimum wage on the probability that 
a poor household at time t becomes non-poor at time t+1and vice versa, that a non-poor 
household at time t becomes poor at t+1.   Specifically, we estimate two poverty 
transition equations.  In the first, using a sample of workers in poor households in time t, 
we estimate a probit equation of the form: 
, it t t
T
1 t It 2 it It 1 o    it μ YR γ Σ GDP a β X MW a α V Prob(OUTPO ln ln ) 1    (6) 
In equation 6, OUTPOVit equals one if the family of worker i is poor in time t but not 
poor in time t+1, and zero if the family of worker i is poor at time t and stays poor in time 
t+1.  The independent variables include the change in the log of the minimum wage 
applicable to the worker’s job in time t.  The coefficient on this minimum wage variable, 
1 a , allows us to measure the impact of an increase in the minimum wage on the 
probability that a worker’s household will move out of poverty.  We estimate the impact 
of minimum wages on the transition out of poverty separately for household heads and 
non-heads, and for household heads with different characteristics.  The other variables in 
equation (6) are the same as those in the employment transition equations. 
 
Next, using a sample of workers in non-poor households in time t, we estimate a probit 
equation of the form: 
, it t t
T
1 t It 2 it It 1 o    it μ YR γ Σ GDP a β X MW a α Prob(INPOV ln ln ) 1   (7) 
In equation 7, INPOVit equals one if the family of worker i is not poor in time t but is 
poor in time t+1, and zero if the family of worker i is not poor at time t and stays not poor 
in time t+1.  The independent variables include the change in the log of the minimum 
wage of applicable to the worker’s job in time t.  The coefficient on this variable,  1 a , 
allows us to measure the impact of an increase in the minimum wage on the probability 
that a family that was not poor will become poor.  We estimate the impact of minimum 
wages on the transition into poverty separately for household heads and non-heads, and 21 
 
for household heads with different characteristics.  The other variables in equation (7) are 
the same as those in the employment transition equations. 
 
The results of the estimation of equations (6) and (7) are presented in Table 9.  The 
findings in Table 9 indicate that increases in the minimum wage will pull households out 
of poverty but will not throw households into poverty.  We find that the marginal effect 
of an increase in the minimum wage has no statistically significant impact on the 
probability that a worker in a non-poor household becomes poor in the next period, 
irrespective of the characteristics of the household.  On the other hand, a 1% increase in 
the minimum wage will increase the probability that a worker in a poor household at t 
will become non-poor at t+1 by 0.12 percentage points.  Higher minimum wages help 
pull families out of poverty only if the higher minimum wage applies to the head of the 
household; a higher minimum wage for a non-household head has an insignificant impact 
on the probability that a poor family will leave poverty.  
 
We have found that higher minimum wages in Nicaragua increase the probability that a 
household will transition out of poverty, even though higher minimum wages lead to 
decreases in employment in the private covered sector.   Further, we found that the 
positive impact of minimum wages on the transition out of poverty occurs only if the 
minimum wage increases for the household head; increases in minimum wages for non-
heads do not improve the chances that a household will leave poverty.  This suggests that 
the negative impact of higher minimum wages on private covered sector employment 
might be less for household heads compared to non-heads.  If employers in Nicaragua 
tend to be paternalistic, they may be more likely to keep a worker that they know is the 
head of a household with dependents rather than a worker that they perceive as a 
secondary earner, whose income is less important for the household. Hence we next re-
estimate equations as in Tables 4 and 5, but distinguishing whether the worker is the head 
of the household or not.   
 
We find support in Table 10 for the hypothesis that, faced with an increase in minimum 
wages, private covered sector employers in Nicaragua tend to layoff non-heads of 22 
 
household more easily than heads of households.  Although Table 10 presents evidence 
that both household heads and non-heads are more likely to lose their employment in the 
private covered sector when minimum wages increase, the marginal effect is nearly twice 
as large for non-heads as heads.
16   
   
Further, the destination sectors for those workers who lose their employment in the 
private covered sector because of higher minimum wages differ between household heads 
and non-heads.  In Table 11 we present the marginal effects of the same equation 
estimated in Table 5 but for heads v. non-heads of household.   Non-heads who leave the 
private covered sector are most likely to become unpaid family workers or to leave the 
labor force (and therefore do not receive any wage), while household heads who leave the 
private covered sector are most likely to become self-employed (where they are still 
making income).
17  Thus, when minimum wages cause workers to lose their employment 
in the private covered sector, the negative impact on family income is much greater if the 
worker is a non-head compared to a household head.  Given the relative size of their 
incomes, the fact that the head of the household is able to replace some portion of his/her 
income with self-employment earnings can also help explain why the negative 
employment effects of higher minimum wages do not push households into poverty.    
 
In the first part of this paper, we found that a 10% increase in the minimum wage 
increased the average wage of private covered sector workers within 20% of the 
minimum wage by about 5%, but also resulted in about 5% of private covered sector 
workers losing employment in the covered sector.  We also found that, on average, 
workers who lost their jobs in the private covered sector were likely to become unpaid 
family workers or leave the labor force, and thus earn no income.  Given the 
counteracting wage and employment effects, it was surprising that we found that a higher 
                                                 
16 Contrary to our results, Neumark, Cunningham and Siga (2006) find that in Brazil higher minimum 
wages have a negative impact on the employment of household heads but a small positive impact on the 
employment and hours worked of non-heads, and Arango and Panchón (2004)  find that in Colombia 
negative employment effects are larger for household heads compared to non-heards. 
17 Note that for  non-heads the marginal effect of higher minimum wages on the probability of moving from 
the private covered sector to self employment is negative and significant, indicating that a higher minimum 
wage reduces the probability that a non-head will move from the private covered sector into self-
employment. 23 
 
minimum wage led to a reduction in poverty among households.  The solution to this 
seeming puzzle is the different impacts a higher minimum wage has on household heads 
and non-heads.   Household heads (who in general earn the highest fraction of household 
income) are less likely than non-household heads to lose their employment in the private 
covered sector when minimum wages increase.  Further, those household heads who do 
lose their employment in the private covered sector are likely to move into the self-
employed sector and do not see their incomes reduced to zero.  On the other hand, non-
household heads who lose their employment in the private covered sector become unpaid 





In this paper we found that in Nicaragua, during the 1998-2006 period, increases in the 
minimum wage increased the wages and decreased the employment of workers in the 
private covered sector.  However, minimum wages affected only those workers whose 
initial wage (before the change in minimum wage) was close to the minimum.  For 
example, increases in legal minimum wage rates led to significant increases in the 
average wages of private covered sector workers who had wages within 20% of the 
minimum wage before the change, but had no significant impact on wages in other parts 
of the distribution.  The effects were stronger among workers in large firms than in small 
firms. We found that employment in the private covered sector fell when minimum 
wages increased both because increases in minimum wages resulted in workers losing 
employment in the private covered sector, and also because higher minimum wages 
resulted in a reduction in new hires into the private covered sector from the uncovered 
sectors.   Most workers who lost their employment in the private covered sector as a 
result of higher legal minimum wages left the labor force or went into unpaid family 
work.  We found no evidence that these workers became unemployed.  
 
Our analysis of the relationship between the minimum wage and poverty found: a) 
increases in legal minimum wages increased the probability that a poor worker’s family 24 
 
moved out of poverty, and b) increases in legal minimum wages were more likely to 
reduce the incidence of poverty and improve the transition from poor to non-poor if they 
impacted the head of the household rather than the non-head.  This was because a head of 
household was less likely than a non-head to lose his/her employment in the private 
covered sector if minimum wages increased, and because those heads who did lose 
employment were more likely to go to another paying job (in self-employment) than non-
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APPENDIX: 
Relationship Between the Levels of the Poverty Lines and Minimum Wages 
 
Fields, Han and Kanbur (2007) point out that if the minimum wage is set above the 
poverty line, then an increase in the minimum wage will not affect the poverty rate 
(because those whose wage increases because of the minimum wage increase were 
already non-poor).  However, it is complicated by the fact that a poverty line is set for a 
family and the minimum wage usually is for an individual.  However, it turns out that in 
Nicaragua, one minimum wage is supposed to support an average family; hence this 
makes comparing the level of the minimum wage to the poverty line a worthwhile 
exercise.    
 
In Nicaragua there are two sets of poverty lines, one constructed by INEC, the National 
Institute of Statistics and Census, and the other by FIDEG.  In our analysis we use the 
one by FIDEG, but we think it is instructive to understand how each is constructed and 
the relationship between the two.  In the FIDEG survey the poverty lines are based on the 
value of a basic basket of 53 goods and services consumed by a family of four adults and 
two children, which is fixed by the Central Bank of Nicaragua each year. The goods and 
services in the basket, determined as the basic needs (protein and caloric as well as 
housing, clothing, transportation, etc.), are valued each year at the market prices. The 
extreme poverty line is set at the value of one basket while the poverty line is set at the 
value of two baskets.  During the time of our study, the methodology for calculating the 
basic basket did not change.   INEC sets a poverty line based on consumption and using 
data from the World Banks LSMS in 1998, 2001 and 2005. The extreme poverty line is 
defined as cost of the annual level of food consumption needed to satisfy the minimum 
caloric needs of a person, which were determined as 2,187 calories per day in 1998 and 
2001 and 2,241 calories per day in 2005.  The poverty line was equal to the amount of the 
extreme poverty line plus an additional sum to cover the cost of consuming essential non-
food goods and services (such as housing, transportation, education, clothing, housing, 
etc.).    
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In Panel A of Table A5 we present the poverty lines (in nominal Córdobas) for poverty 
and extreme poverty in the years 1998-2006 as calculated by FIDEG and INEC.  The first 
two columns present the data as reported by each institution and in the next two we report 
the data in comparable terms ―monthly income per capita.‖ It is clear from the last two 
columns of the table that the ratio between the two sources is fairly constant.  In each of 
the three years, the FIDEG per capita poverty and extreme poverty lines are about 40-
50% higher than the INEC poverty lines.  Hence, we should be aware that we are using a 
relatively high poverty line in this study.   
 
In Panel B of Table A5 we compare the minimum monthly minimum wage and the 
average monthly minimum wage (weighted by the number of workers in the sample in 
each minimum wage category) to the monthly poverty lines.  We do so for both the per 
capita poverty line (i.e., for one individual) and the poverty line for a family of six 
individuals, since the law stipulates that the minimum wage should support a family.  As 
we can see from Table 7, panel B, the minimum wage is set well below both the extreme 
poverty line and the poverty line for a family of 6.  This is true whether we compare the 
average minimum wage or the minimum minimum wage to the poverty line. The average 
minimum wage is between 25% and 42% of the extreme poverty line for a family of six 
and between 12% and 21% of the poverty line for a family of six.  For a family with only 
one member, the minimum minimum wage is set above the per capita extreme poverty 
line but below the per capita poverty line, while the average minimum wage is set above 
both the extreme poverty line and the per capital poverty line.   Over time, the minimum 
wage increases relative to the poverty line.  What is clear is that the minimum wage could 
not possible cover the needs of a family; at best it may cover the minimum basic needs of 
an individual (although this depends on which minimum wage applies).   Therefore, there 
is clearly scope for higher minimum wages to affect the poverty rate in Nicaragua. 
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Figure 1:  Graphs of Log Wage - Log Minimum Wage, All Years and All Workers 
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Figure 2:  Graphs of Log Wage - Log Minimum Wage, All Years, Full-time Workers Only 
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                       Table 1: Real Minimum Wage (Córdobas per hour) in Nicaragua, 1997-2006 
Categories 
1997  1998*  1999  2000*  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Nov  -  Aug  -  Mar  May  Aug  Jun  May  Mar 
Agriculture**  0.90  0.79  1.08  1.00  1.14  1.17  1.18  1.17  1.23  1.26 
Fishing  1.51  1.32  1.69  1.56  1.63  1.74  1.82  1.82  1.90  1.99 
Mining  1.81  1.58  2.05  1.89  1.97  2.10  2.20  2.19  2.30  2.35 
Industry  1.51  1.32  1.45  1.33  1.39  1.47  1.58  1.57  1.64  1.76 
Industry under special regime   -   -  1.93  1.78  1.86  1.93  1.98  1.98  2.07  2.14 
Electricity and Gas  1.81  1.58  2.17  2.00  2.10  2.24  2.25  2.25  2.35  2.40 
Water  1.81  1.58  2.17  2.00  2.10  2.24  2.25  2.25  2.35  2.40 
Trades, Restaurants and Hotels  1.66  1.45  2.17  2.00  2.10  2.15  2.25  2.25  2.35  2.40 
Transport, storage and communication  1.36  1.19  2.17  2.00  2.10  2.24  2.25  2.25  2.35  2.40 
Construction  1.45  1.27  2.90  2.67  2.70  2.75  2.77  2.77  2.93  2.93 
Financial  2.11  1.85  2.41  2.22  2.32  2.48  2.77  2.77  2.93  2.93 
Insurance  1.96  1.72  2.41  2.22  2.32  2.48  2.77  2.77  2.93  2.93 
Comunitary, personal and domestic services  1.42  1.24  1.69  1.56  1.63  1.67  1.65  1.70  1.78  1.83 
Central and municipal governments  1.05  0.92  1.33  1.22  1.31  1.52  1.53  1.54  1.61  1.63 
Source: MITRAB (Ministry of Labor)                               
Notes: *No negotiation.  Same minimum wage as in previous year.                               
**Agricultural workers receive food (in-kind) in addition to this pay  (Artículo No. 202 Código del Trabajo)                
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Table 2: Percent of Workers in Nicaragua Earning Within 
20%, Below and Above the Legal Minimum Wage, By Sector 
(averages over 1998-2006). 
 







MW    
Sample 
Size 
All Workers:  
          Private Covered Sector  23.3  25.5  51.3 
 
11614 
   Large Firms  11.4  24.2  64.5 
 
5533 
   Small Firms  34.2  26.6  39.2 
 
6055 
Covered Public Sector  4.1  9.4  86.5 
 
1939 
Uncovered Self-employed Sector  24.6  15.6  59.9     8358 
Full-time Workers Only                
Private Covered Sector  20.7  26.4  52.9 
 
4803 
   Large Firms  10.0  23.7  66.3     2500 
   Small Firms  32.5  29.4  38.2     2283 
Covered Public Sector  2.8  8.9  88.3     864 
Uncovered Self-employed Sector  25.4  15.9  58.9     3067 
       
  
  Source: Author's calculations using FIDEG and MITRAB data. 




Table 3:  Elasticity of the Wage With Respect to the Minimum Wage in the Covered Sector 
                     
For workers who remain in the   All Workers 
All Workers within 
20% of                 
MW at time t 
Full-time Workers 
within 20% of      
MW at time t 
following sectors at time t and t+1:  
Coeff. 
Standard 
Error  Coeff. 
Standard 
Error  Coeff. 
Standard 
Error 
                             
private covered    0.247  0.237     0.579  0.267  **  0.651  0.084  *** 
    large-firm private    -0.222  0.345     0.561  0.414     1.037  0.365  ** 
    small-firm private   0.094  0.588     0.306  0.117  **  0.702  0.224  ** 
self-employed     0.094  0.420     0.652  0.493     -0.173  0.202    
                    Notes: *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10% 
        The dependent variable is the change in the log of hourly wage  
          and the key independent variable is the change in the real minimum wage; 
        we report the estimated coefficients for  1 in equation (1) for samples identified by row and column. 
Reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and corrected for clustering of errors  
  in the industry of the worker (which also corresponds to the minimum wage 
category). 




Table 4:  Marginal Impact of Minimum Wages on the Probability that a Worker Keeps His/Her 
Employment in the Covered Sector  
 
                   
For workers in the  All Workers 
 
All workers within 20% of 
MW at time t 
Full-time workers 
within 20% of MW at 
time t 
following sectors at time t:  Marginal 









private covered  -0.310  0.099  ***  -0.522  0.189  ***  -0.509  0.382    
 large-firm private  -0.615  0.219  ***  -1.197  0.266  ***  -2.126  0.724  *** 
 small-firm private   0.038  0.393     -0.089  0.428     -0.847  1.358 
                               
Notes: Table reports marginal effects evaluated at the means of all variables, from estimates of   1  in equation (2) 
using probit regressions for samples identified by row and column.  A positive coefficient means that higher minimum 
wages increase the probability that a worker stays in the indicated covered sector.  *** = significant at 1%, ** = 
significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%.  Reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and corrected for 
clustering of errors in the industry of the worker (which also corresponds to the minimum wage category). 
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All Workers  All Workers within  
20% of MW at time t 
Full-time Workers 















Panel A: Multinomial Logit Regression (Origin is Private Covered Sector)        
Public  0.069  0.031  **  0.112  0.024  ***  -0.302  0.418 
 
Self-employed  -0.018  0.066     0.043  0.100     0.206  0.211 
 
Unpaid Family Worker  0.144  0.079  *  0.174  0.063  ***  0.421  0.081  *** 
Unemployed  -0.046  0.047     -0.035  0.047     0.086  0.108    
Not in the Labor Force  0.152  0.063  **  0.213  0.056  ***  -0.068  0.165    
Panel B: Unconditional Probabilities of Leaving the Private Covered Sector    
  Stay in Private Sector     0.547        0.540    
 
0.558 
  Public     0.036        0.042        0.036    
Self-employed     0.107        0.111        0.103 
 
Unpaid Family Worker     0.047        0.053        0.046    
Unemployed     0.047        0.042        0.042 
 
Not in the Labor Force     0.219        0.211        0.213 
 
Sample Size     9247        2593        1016    
  
                 
Notes: Panel A provides marginal effects, based on estimates of  1kz, evaluated at the means of all variables, in 
equation (3) using multinomial logit regressions, respectively, for samples identified by row and column.  A 
positive coefficient means that higher minimum wages increase the probability of a transition from the private 
covered sector (and into the indicated uncovered sector). *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = 
significant at 10%. Reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and corrected for clustering of 




Table 6:  Marginal Impact of Minimum Wages on the Probability of Entering the Private 
Covered Sector from Another Sector 
                             
  
All Workers  All Workers within  
20% of MW at time t  Full-time Workers 















Panel A: Probit Regression (Destination is the Private Covered Sector) 
All Others (non-private)  -0.095  0.125     -0.524  0.079  ***  -2.696  6.229  **** 
Public  -7.925  1.499  ***  -7.874  1.934  ***  -20.421  5.133  *** 
Self-employed  -0.157  0.081  *  -0.281  0.042  ***  -0.564  0.284  ** 
Unpaid Family Worker  0.119  0.078     n.a.  n.a.     n.a.  n.a.    
             
  
    Panel B: Unconditional Probability of Entering the Private Sector from Another Sector 
  
All Others (non-private)     0.109        0.131        0.207    
Public     0.219        0.256        0.268 
 
Self-employed     0.087        0.083        0.119 
 
Unpaid Family Worker     0.097        n.a.        n.a. 
 
Sample Size     3581        1263        676    
                   
Notes: Table provide marginal effects of the estimated  1z in a variant of equation (3) using probit  
for samples identified by row and column.  A positive coefficient means that higher minimum 
wages increase the probability of a transition into the private covered sector from another sector.  
***= significant at 1%, **= significant at 5%, *= significant at 10%. Reported standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and corrected for clustering of errors in the industry of the worker 























Table 7: Percent of Workers Earning Within 20%, Below and Above the Legal Minimum 
Wage, by Whether the Household is Poor or Not 
















MW  At    MW 
Above 
MW 
Extremely Poor  51  29  16  45  21  9  54  34  21 
Poor  27  27  17  26  21  10  28  30  21 
Not Poor  22  44  67  59  57  81  18  36  58 
Sample Size  4837  4444  12648  1302  1324  5314  3535  3120  7334 
                    Note: Using the FIDEG definition of poverty. 
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Table 8: Impact of Changes in Minimum Wages on 






Error    
    
        All   -0.070  0.100    
    Head of HH  -0.124  0.065  * 
    Non-Head of HH  -0.033  0.108 
   
   
  
      Male Head of HH  -0.120  0.116    
    Female Head of HH  -0.101  0.076 
   
            Head of HH with 1 worker  -0.009  0.064 
      Head of HH with 2+ workers  -0.166  0.069  ** 
           
Note: Using the survey's definition of poverty. A negative 
coefficient means that higher minimum wages lower the 
probability that a household is poor at time t+1. *** = significant at 
1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%.  Reported 
standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and corrected for 
clustering of errors in the industry of the worker (which also 





Table 9:  Marginal Impact of Minimum Wages on the Probability of a Worker's 
Family Transitions Into or Out of Poverty 
 
  
Transition from              
Poor to Non-Poor  
Transition from         










All Workers  0.122  0.066  *  0.113  0.078    
Head of Household  0.160  0.096  *  0.075  0.141    
Non-Head of Household   0.095  0.104     0.143  0.154    
  Male Head of HH  0.145  0.083  *  0.056  0.123 
    Female Head of HH  0.183  0.079  **  0.160  0.155 
    Head of HH with 1 worker  0.132  0.101     0.271  0.262 
    Head of HH with 2+ workers  0.172  0.102  *  0.013  0.105    
Note: A positive coefficient means that higher minimum wages increase the 
probability of a transition.  *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = 
significant at 10%.  Reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and corrected for clustering of errors in the industry of the worker (which also 




Table 10:  Marginal Impact of Minimum Wages on the Probability that a 
Worker Keeps His/Her Job in the Covered Sector  
 
For workers in the following 
All Heads of 
Households (HH)  All Non-heads of HH 









  private   -0.175  0.110     -0.384  0.111  *** 
   large-firm private  -0.366  0.187  *   -0.753  0.230  *** 
   small-firm private   0.005  0.399     0.057  0.386    
 
  
             
For workers in the following 
All Heads of HH  within 
20% of MW at time t 
All Non-Heads within 
20% of MW at time t 









  private   -0.447  0.143  ***  -0.558  0.213  ** 
   large-firm private  -0.884  0.084  ***  -1.331  0.352  *** 
   small-firm private   -0.079  0.459     -0.094  0.413    
 
               
Notes: Table reports marginal effects evaluated at the means of all variables, from 
estimates of  1 in equation (2) using probit regressions for samples identified by row 
and column.  A positive coefficient means that higher minimum wages increase the 
probability that a worker stays in the indicated covered sector.  *** = significant at 1%, 
** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%.  Reported standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and corrected for clustering of errors in the industry of the worker 





Table 11: Marginal Effect of Minimum Wages on the Probability of 




All Heads of 
Households (HH) 











                      
 
Public  0.097  0.031  ***  0.074  0.059    
 
Self-employed  0.244  0.103  **  -0.264  0.075  *** 
 
Unpaid Family Worker  -0.175  0.067  **  0.192  0.095  ** 
 
Unemployed  -0.097  0.060 
 
-0.009  0.041 
   




All Heads of HH within 
20% of MW at time t 
All Non-Heads within 











                      
 
Public  0.143  0.313 
 
0.110  0.062  * 
 
Self-employed  0.287  0.159  *  -0.146  0.052  ** 
 
Unpaid Family Worker  -0.084  0.055     0.264  0.128  ** 
 
Unemployed  -0.070  0.029  **  -0.010  0.052 
   
Not in the Labor Force  -0.072  0.140     0.289  0.063  *** 
 
               
Notes: Table provides marginal effects, based on estimates of  1kz, evaluated at 
the means of all variables, in equation (3) using multinomial logit regressions, 
respectively, for samples identified by row and column.  A positive coefficient 
means that higher minimum wages increase the probability of a transition from 
the private covered sector. *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = 
significant at 10%. Reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and corrected for clustering of errors in the industry of the worker (which also 





Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of Panel Data  
               
Individual Data (for the sample used to estimate the 
employment equations): 
Household Data (for the sample used to 
estimate the employment equations):    
   
  
  Number of Individuals  8682  Number of households  3378 
Number of observations  27000  Number of observations  14334 
Average number of observations per 
individual 
3.1 
Average number of observations per household 
 
4.2 
   
  
  Percent of individuals with 9 observations  6.86  Share of households headed by women  34.28 
Percent of individuals with 8 observations  5.51  Distribution of households by number of 
members    Percent of individuals with 7 observations  5.83 
  Percent of individuals with 6 observations  6.63  1  1.22 
Percent of individuals with 5 observations  9.54  2  3.64 
Percent of individuals with 4 observations  13.41  3  8.02 
Percent of individuals with 3 observations  19.95  4  13.52 
Percent of individuals with 2 observations  32.27  5  15.36 
   
6  14.33 
Percent Female  42.07    more than 6  43.91 
Percent Urban  47.21    
 
Distribution by Education Level 
 
Distribution of households by number of working 
members 
  None (0 years of education)  10.37  1  27.51 
  Primary (1-8 years of education)  45.17  2  31.89 
  Secondary (9-12 years of education)  35.15  3  19.06 
  Higher  9.31  4  11.48 
 
   5  5.52 
Percent working in:  All Workers  6  3.43 
 large private sector covered firms  13.26    more than 6  0.83 
 small private sector covered firms  14.69    
  public sector  4.71  Distribution of households by number of 
nonworking members    self-employed  28.91 
  unpaid family workers  19.40  1  10.06 
unemployed  2.13  2  15.77 
out of the labor force  16.91  3  18.28 
full-time  64.00  4  16.64 
part-time  36.00  5  13.50 
Within 20% of minimum wage at time t  6  10.55 
Percent working in: 
 
  more than 6  14.71 
 large private sector covered firms  27.58    
   small private sector covered firms  14.08    
  public sector  34.39 
    full-time  71.54 
    part-time  28.46       44 
 
 
Table A2: Comparison of the FIDEG data with LSMS data -- Distribution of 
Employed 
  
   FIDEG 
EMNV - 
LSMS 
   1998  2005  1998  2005 
Economic Sector             
Primary  33.9  27.2  35.9  35.1 
Agriculture  33.9  27.2  35.9  35.1 
Secondary  15.2  17.8  14.6  18.7 
Mines  -  0.1  0.5  0.4 
Manufacturing  15.2  15.3  9.4  14.0 
Special regime  -  2.3  -  - 
Construction  -  -  4.7  4.2 
Tertiary  50.9  55.0  49.4  46.2 
Electricity, gas and water  -  -  0.6  0.8 
Commerce, hotels and restaurants  50.4  48.0  24.1  21.7 
Transportation and communication  -  3.1  3.7  3.4 
Finance  -  -  0.4  0.7 
Personal and social services  0.5  3.9  20.6  19.9 
Employment Status:             
Owner  3.5  3.2  3.6  4.5 
Self-employed  32.5  32.6  27.5  30.2 
Paid employee  43.9  40.5  52.8  49.0 
Unpaid  20.1  23.7  15.8  16.3 
Unemployment             
National  7.7  4.2  11.6  4.0 
Urban  9.5  5.1  13.9  5.8 
Rural  5.9  3.4  8.7  1.5 
Men  4.6  2.9  10.6  3.7 
Women  12.2  5.8  13.5  4.5 
Mean Monthly Salary (1994 Cordobas)             
National  671.5  759.9  804.1  864.7 
Urban  724.8  812.3  995.3  1041.3 
Rural  601.5  689.3  502.8  570.0 
Men  775.7  933.2  896.0  948.3 
Women  534.8  569.8  637.3  714.9 
Median Monthly Salary (1994 Cordobas)             
National  385.6  465.4  449.9  500.4 
Urban  501.3  558.6  525.1  620.6 
Rural  334.2  403.3  321.3  349.1 
Men  501.3  581.8  462.7  543.1 





Table A3: Marginal Impact of Minimum Wages on the 
Probability of Leaving the Large Firm Private Covered 
Sector for Another Sector 
                   




Effect  Standard Error 
 
Public  0.478  0.116  *** 
 
Small-firm    0.837  0.399  ** 
 
Self-employed  0.580  0.045  *** 
 
Unpaid Family Worker  0.806  0.225  *** 
 
Unemployed  0.206  0.248 
   
Not in the Labor Force  0.738  0.279  ** 
 
         
Notes: Marginal effects are calculated based on estimates of 
1kz, evaluated at the means of all variables, in equation (3) 
using multinomial logit regressions, respectively, for samples 
identified by row and column.  A positive coefficient means that 
higher minimum wages increase the probability of a transition 
from the large firm private covered sector. *** = significant at 
1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%. Reported 
standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and corrected 
for clustering of errors in the industry of the worker (which also 
corresponds to the minimum wage category). 46 
 
 
Table A4:  Marginal Impact of Minimum Wages on the 
Probability of Entering the Large Firm Private Covered Sector 
from Another Sector 
         
Destination Sector: Large-firm Private Sector 
  
  Origin Sector:  Coefficient  Standard Error 
 
Public  -0.057  0.043    
 
Small-firm    0.064  0.211    
 
Self-employed  -0.027  0.045    
 
Unpaid Family Worker  0.085  0.022  *** 
 
         
Notes: Table provide marginal effects of the estimated  1z in a variant of 
equation (3) using probit estimation for samples identified by row and 
column.  A positive coefficient means that higher minimum wages 
increase the probability of a transition into the large firm private covered 
sector from another sector.  ***= significant at 1%, **= significant at 5%, 
*= significant at 10%. Reported standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and corrected for clustering of errors in the industry of 





Table A5: Poverty Lines and Minimum Wages in Nominal Córdobas 
     
                      Panel A: Relationship between the FIDEG and INEC Poverty Lines 














Poverty  Poverty 
Extreme 
Poverty  Poverty 
Extreme 
Poverty  Poverty 
Extreme 
Poverty  Poverty 



























Poverty  Poverty 
1998  1578.2  3156.5  2246.0  4259.0  263.0  526.1  187.2  354.9  1.4  1.5 
1999  1694.1  3388.2 
   
282.3  564.7 
   
  
  2000  1852.4  3704.7 
   
308.7  617.5 
   
  
  2001  1980.1  3960.3  2691.0  5157.0  330.0  660.0  224.3  429.8  1.5  1.5 
2002  2078.1  4156.2 
   
346.3  692.7 
   
  
  2003  2208.9  4417.9 
   
368.2  736.3 
   
  
  2004  2464.6  4929.2 
   
410.8  821.5 
   
  
  2005  2682.7  5365.3  3927.5  7154.8  447.1  894.2  327.3  596.2  1.4  1.5 
2006  2937.7  5875.4        489.6  979.2             
        
                Panel B:  Relationship Between the Minimum Wage and the FIDEG Poverty Lines 



















% of  
Poverty 
for HH of 
6 individ. 






MW as % 
of  Poverty 
for 1 
individual 
MW as % of 
Extreme 
Poverty for 
HH of 6 
individ. 
MW as 




individ.  Year 
Minimum 




Monthly   
Min 
Wage 
1998  300.0  114.1  57.0  19.0  9.5  401.8  152.8  76.4  25.5  12.7 
1999  450.0  159.4  79.7  26.6  13.3  610.6  216.3  108.1  36.0  18.0 
2000  450.0  145.8  72.9  24.3  12.1  632.9  205.0  102.5  34.2  17.1 
2001  550.0  166.7  83.3  27.8  13.9  724.1  219.4  109.7  36.6  18.3 
2002  580.0  167.5  83.7  27.9  14.0  783.1  226.1  113.1  37.7  18.8 
2003  615.0  167.0  83.5  27.8  13.9  859.5  233.5  116.7  38.9  19.5 
2004  669.0  162.9  81.4  27.1  13.6  914.0  222.5  111.3  37.1  18.5 
2005  769.0  172.0  86.0  28.7  14.3  1052.4  235.4  117.7  39.2  19.6 
2006  869.0  177.5  88.7  29.6  14.8  1242.3  253.7  126.9  42.3  21.1 
Sources: FIDEG, INEC and MITRAB 
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Table A2-1:  Elasticity of the Wage With Respect to the Minimum Wage  in the Covered Sector, Dynamic Panel Data Model Estimates 
                    Arellano and Bond Difference Estimator 
                  
                 
For workers who remain in the   All Workers 
All Workers within 20% of             
MW at time t 
Full-time Workers within 
20% of MW at time t 
following sectors at time t and t+1:  
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
                             
private covered    0.093  0.083 
 
0.148  0.088  *  0.068  0.092    
    large-firm private    0.035  0.126 
 
0.17  0.136     0.183  0.135    
    small-firm private   0.313  0.118  **  0.316  0.123  **  0.008  0.152    
self-employed     -0.194  0.275     -0.316  0.281     -0.589  0.316  * 
                    Note: standard error estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity and possible clustering of errors in the industry of the worker. 
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Table A2-2:  Elasticity of the Wage With Respect to the Minimum Wage  in the Covered Sector, Including Industry Dummies as 
Explanatory Variables 
  
                 
For workers who remain in the   All Workers 
All Workers within 20% of             
MW at time t 
Full-time Workers within 
20% of MW at time t 
following sectors at time t and t+1:  
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
                             
private covered    0.243  0.226 
 
0.578  0.196  **  0.624  0.091  *** 
    large-firm private    -0.241  0.201 
 
0.547  0.449     0.977  0.393  ** 
    small-firm private   -0.04  0.307 
 
0.597  0.117  ***  0.621  0.216  ** 
self-employed     0.046  0.067     0.605  0.120  ***  -0.077  0.219    
                    Notes: *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10% 
          The dependent variable is the change in the log of hourly wage  
            and the key independent variable is the change in the real minimum wage; 
          we report the estimated coefficients for a1 in equation (1) for samples identified by row and column. 
      Reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and corrected for clustering of errors  
      in the industry of the worker (which also corresponds to the minimum wage categories). 
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Table A2-3:  Elasticity of the Wage With Respect to the Minimum Wage  in the Covered Sector, For Workers Not Within 20% of the 
Minimum Wage 
  
                 
For workers who remain in the    
All Workers above not within 
20% of MW at time t 
Full-time Workers not within 
20% of MW at time t 
following sectors at time t and t+1:  
      Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
                             
private covered         
 
0.132  0.247     0.025  0.363    
    large-firm private         
 
-0.371  0.357     -0.143  0.294    
    small-firm private        
 
-0.010  0.438     0.249  0.340    
self-employed              -0.038  0.429     -0.378  0.054  *** 
                    Notes: *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10% 
          The dependent variable is the change in the log of hourly wage  
            and the key independent variable is the change in the real minimum wage; 
          we report the estimated coefficients for a1 in equation (1) for samples identified by row and column. 
      Reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and corrected for clustering of errors  
      in the industry of the worker (which also corresponds to the minimum wage categories). 
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Table A2-4: Percent of Workers in Nicaragua Earning Within 
20%, Below and Above the Legal Minimum Wage, By Sector 
and Gender (averages over 1998-2006) 
 
         
Male 
       
Sector 
Below 





All Workers:  
        Private Covered Sector  16.2  25.9  57.9  7610 
   Large Firms  10.6  23.8  65.6  3851 
   Small Firms  22.0  28.0  50.0  3736 
Covered Public Sector  3.9  9.7  86.5  829 
Uncovered Self-employed Sector  14.3  12.3  73.4  3303 
Full-time Workers Only             
Private Covered Sector  14.4  26.8  58.8  3184 
   Large Firms  9.2  23.8  67.1  1767 
   Small Firms  12.2  30.7  48.2  1399 
Covered Public Sector  2.4  8.8  88.8  411 
Uncovered Self-employed Sector  12.8  12.6  74.6  1368 
         
Female 
       
Sector 
Below 





All Workers:  
        Private Covered Sector  36.7  24.6  38.7  4004 
   Large Firms  13.1  24.9  62.0  1682 
   Small Firms  53.8  24.4  21.8  2319 
Covered Public Sector  4.2  9.2  86.6  1110 
Uncovered Self-employed Sector  31.3  17.7  51.0  5055 
Full-time Workers Only             
Private Covered Sector  33.0  25.8  41.4  1619 
   Large Firms  12.0  23.6  64.4  733 
   Small Firms  50.5  27.3  22.3  884 
Covered Public Sector  3.1  9.1  87.9  453 
Uncovered Self-employed Sector  35.5  18.5  46.0  1699 53 
 
Table A2-5:  Elasticity of the Wage w.r.t. the Minimum Wage  in the Covered Sector, by Gender 
   
                    Male 
                    
                 
For all workers who remain in the   All Workers 
All Workers within 20% 
of             MW at time t 
Full-time Workers within 20% 
of MW at time t 
following sectors at time t and t+1:  
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  Coefficient  Standard Error 
                             
private covered    0.159  0.124 
 
0.707  0.156  ***  0.741  0.142  *** 
    large-firm private    -0.083  0.098 
 
0.887  0.363  **  0.959  0.402  ** 
    small-firm private   -0.598  0.251  **  0.48  0.252   *  0.692  0.295  ** 
self-employed     -1.633  0.144  ***  0.008  0.262     0.207  0.289    
                   
Female 
                    
                 
For all workers who remain in the   All Workers 
All Workers within 20% 
of             MW at time t 
Full-time Workers within 20% 
of MW at time t 
following sectors at time t and t+1:  
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error  Coefficient  Standard Error 
                             
private covered    0.498  0.197  **  0.521  0.089  ***  0.679  0.139  *** 
    large-firm private    0.108  0.369     1.154  0.219  ***  1.11  0.34  *** 
    small-firm private   -0.175  0.587     0.023  0.399     0.969  0.166  *** 
self-employed     0.260  0.049  ***  0.351  0.035  ***  0.379  0.232    
 
     
              Notes: *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10% 
          The dependent variable is the change in the log of hourly wage  
            and the key independent variable is the change in the real minimum wage; 
          we report the estimated coefficients for a1 in equation (1) for samples identified by row and column. 
      Reported standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and corrected for clustering of errors  
      in the industry of the worker (which also corresponds to the minimum wage categories). 
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Table A2-6: Marginal Impact of Minimum Wages on the Probability that a Worker Keeps 
His/Her Job in the Covered Sector , by Gender 
                    Male 
                 
For all workers in the 
following  All Workers 
All workers within 
20% of MW at time t 
Full-time workers 
within 20% of MW at 
time t 
sectors at time t:  Marginal 
Effect  Std. Error 
Marginal 
Effect  Std. Error 
Marginal 
Effect  Std. Error 
private covered  -0.269  0.128  **  -0.422  0.265     -0.461  0.658    
 large-firm private  -0.563  0.251  **  -1.070  0.337  ***  -2.260  1.800    
 small-firm private   0.042  0.318     -0.064  0.330     -0.265  0.572    
                             
       
  
         
Female 
                 
For all workers in the 
following  All Workers 
All workers within 
20% of MW at time t 
Full-time workers 
within 20% of MW at 
time t 
sectors at time t:  Marginal 
Effect  Std. Error 
Marginal 
Effect  Std. Error 
Marginal 
Effect  Std. Error 
private covered  -0.448  0.239  *  -0.712  0.321  **  -1.886  0.299  *** 
 large-firm private  -0.676  0.171  ***  -1.389  0.051  ***  -1.633  1.522    
 small-firm private   -0.217  0.437     -0.455  0.493     -3.168  4.123    
                             
                   
Notes: Table reports marginal effects evaluated at the means of all variables, from estimates of   1  in 
equation (2) using probit regressions for samples identified by row and column.  A positive coefficient means 
that higher minimum wages increase the probability that a worker stays in the indicated covered sector.  *** = 
significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%.  Reported standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and corrected for clustering of errors in the industry of the worker (which also corresponds 
to the minimum wage category). 55 
 
Table A2-7: Marginal Impact of Minimum Wages on the Probability of Leaving the Private Covered 
Sector for another Sector, by Gender 
                    Multinomial Logit Regression 
             
Male                      
Origin: Private 
Covered Sector  All Workers 
All Workers within  20% 
of MW at time t 
Full-time Workers 




Effect  Std. Error 
Marginal 
Effect  Std. Error 
Marginal 
Effect  Std. Error 
Public  0.076  0.012  ***  0.099  0.006  ***  -0.206  0.238    
Self-employed  -0.009  0.116     0.086  0.141     -0.086  0.365    
Unpaid Family Worker  0.172  0.100  *  0.198  0.142     0.455  0.037  *** 
Unemployed  -0.036  0.058     -0.029  0.078     0.081  0.109    
Not in the Labor Force  0.036  0.028 
 
0.034  0.052     0.063  0.076    
                    Female                      
Origin: Private 
Covered Sector  All Workers 
All Workers within  20% 
of MW at time t 
Full-time Workers 




Effect  Std. Error 
Marginal 
Effect  Std. Error 
Marginal 
Effect  Std. Error 
Public  0.127  0.152     0.194  0.110  *  -0.073  1.142    
Self-employed  -0.026  0.066     -0.010  0.068     0.910  0.826    
Unpaid Family Worker  0.141  0.118     0.189  0.121     0.402  0.271    
Unemployed  -0.073  0.029  **  -0.055  0.029  *  0.002  0.038    
Not in the Labor Force  0.316  0.158  **  0.414  0.205  **  0.412  0.191  ** 
  
                 
Notes: Table provides marginal effects, based on estimates of  1kz, evaluated at the means of all variables, 
in equation (3) using multinomial logit regressions, respectively, for samples identified by row and column.  
A positive coefficient means that higher minimum wages increase the probability of a transition from the 
private covered sector. *** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%. Reported 
standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and corrected for clustering of errors in the industry of the 
worker (which also corresponds to the minimum wage category). 56 
 
Table A2-8:  Marginal Impact of Minimum Wages on the Probability of Entering the Private Sector 
from Another Sector, by Gender 
Male 
                 
Destination: Private 
Covered Sector  All Workers 
All Workers within  
20% of MW at time t 
Full-time Workers 




Effect  Std. Error 
Marginal 
Effect  Std. Error 
Marginal 
Effect  Std. Error 
All Others (non-private)  -0.071  0.052 
 
-0.456  0.063  ***  -2.049  0.653  *** 
Public  -7.399  0.642  ***  -5.492  2.975  *  -28.410  8.221  *** 
Self-employed  -0.074  0.071     -0.428  0.057  ***  -0.360  0.625    
Unpaid Family Worker  0.143  0.074  *  n.a.  n.a.     n.a.  n.a.    
                    Female 
                 
Destination: Private 
Covered Sector  All Workers 
All Workers within  
20% of MW at time t 
Full-time Workers 




Effect  Std. Error 
Marginal 
Effect  Std. Error 
Marginal 
Effect  Std. Error 
All Others (non-private)  -0.183  0.151 
 
-0.400  0.077  ***  -2.773  0.144  *** 
Public  -18.611  17.191     -153.06  65.746  **  -18.352  4.516  *** 
Self-employed  -0.187  0.071  **  -0.171  0.020  ***  -0.515  0.143  *** 
Unpaid Family Worker  0.096  0.046  **     n.a.        n.a.    
                   
Notes: Table provide marginal effects of the estimated  1z in a variant of equation (3) using probit  
regressions for samples identified by row and column.  A positive coefficient means that higher minimum 
wages increase the probability of a transition into the private covered sector from another sector.  ***= 
significant at 1%, **= significant at 5%, *= significant at 10%. Reported standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and corrected for clustering of errors in the industry of the worker (which also 
indicates the minimum wage category). 57 
 
APPENDIX 3 (supplemental for review by editor and reviewers): 
Are reported changes in education level for individuals due to mis-codings? 
 
In this appendix, we explore the possibility that reported changes in education for individuals in 
the panel data set may be due to mis-codings rather than actual education changes.  Table A3-1 
presents the proportion of the wage equation sample (workers for whom we can observe wages 
for at least two years in a row) that change education levels in a given year.  The average 
proportion of those individuals in a given year who report an increase in their education is 6.1%.    
To explore the possibility that reported changes in education levels for an individual are mis-
codings, we compare the characteristics of those who report an increase in education to those 
who report no change in education status.  If education changes are due to mis-coding or mis-
reporting, then we would not expect to see any differences in the characteristics of those who 
change education and those who do not.  On the other hand, if reported education changes are 
true, we would expect those whose education levels changed to be: (i) younger than those whose 
education did not change—especially, we would expect that those who change education levels 
would be 15-24 years old (although one may also expect to see older workers earning university 
degrees) and (ii) be children of the household head rather than household heads.  Table A3-1 
reports the position in household and age distribution of those who report that their education 
changed compared to those who report no education change.  Consistent with the hypothesis that 
education changes are not due to mis-codings, those who report an increase in their education 
level are more likely to be children of household heads than household heads and to be in the 15-
24 year old age range.   
 
Table A3-2 explores the age issue further by looking at the age distribution of those who report a 
change in their education level, by education level.  Much of table 3-2 is consistent with what we 
would expect if reported education changes were true.  For example, in general those who 
change from primary complete to secondary incomplete and from incomplete secondary to 
complete secondary are disproportionately young (15-24 years old) while those who report 
changing education levels from secondary to incomplete university or incomplete university to 
complete university are more likely to in the age bracket we would expect (20-39 years old).  
However, there are also some unexpected results present in table A3-2.  In particular, a large 
percent of those who report changing from incomplete primary to complete primary are 30 years 
or older.  This last statistic does not make sense unless the majority of those who are changing 
education levels are adults who are returning to finish primary education.  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that this does occur in Nicaragua. 
 
We may gain additional insight into possible mis-codings of the education variable by comparing 
those who report an increase in education compared to those who report that their education level 
declined from one year to the next.  The latter case (where the reported education level for an 
individual fell from time t to time t+1) is clearly due to mis-coding or mis-reporting.   If mis-
codings were random, we would expect as many people to report a decline in their education as 
report an increase in their education.  In the Nicaragua panel data set, almost no one (24 cases, or 
0.3% of the sample) reported that education levels fell from one year to the next; compared to 
6.1% who report an increase in education level from one year to the next.  (Note that we 
eliminated the observations with negative changes in education levels from the data used to 
estimate the wage and employment equations.)   58 
 
 
On balance, we find no convincing evidence that reported changes in education levels for 




Table A3-1: Comparing those who changed and did not change education levels;







% in each category 6.1% 93.9%
Position in Household
  Head 24 33
  Spouse 7 8
  Child 54 44
  Other 15 15
Total 100 100
Age
  15-19 20 11
  20-24 26 22
  25-29 15 18
  30-39 21 24
  40-49 11 15
  50+ 6 11
Total 100 100
Notes:  Negative reported changes in education were dropped.
Data is from employees who report monthly earnings in at least two years.  60 
 
Table A3-2: Age distribution of those who change education levels, by education level, Nicaragua
 
AGE
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50+ TOTAL Sample
  Size
Education level does not change 11 22 18 24 15 11 100 6671
Incomplete primary to complete primary 29 14 14 19 13 12 100 135
Complete primary to incomplete secondary 27 20 13 25 11 4 100 96
Incomplete secondary to technical secondary 12 32 4 32 16 4 100 25
Incomplete primary to academic secondary 24 43 13 8 8 5 100 79
Secondary to incomplete university 2 42 21 29 4 2 100 52
Incomplete universtiy to university complete 0 27 30 25 16 2 100 44
Notes:  Data is from  employees who report monthly earnings in at least two years.  